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Abstract 
Terrestrial sinks have entered the Kyoto Protocol as offsets for carbon sequestration, but 
ocean sinks have escaped attention. Ocean sinks are as unexplored and uncertain as were the 
terrestrial sinks at the time of negotiation. It is not unlikely that certain countries will advocate 
the inclusion of ocean carbon sinks to reduce their emission reduction obligations. We use a 
simple model of the international market for carbon dioxide emissions to evaluate who would 
gain or loose from allowing for ocean carbon sinks. Our analysis is restricted to information 
on anthropogenic carbon sequestration within the exclusive economic zone of a country. Like 
the carbon sequestration of business as usual forest management activities, natural ocean 
carbon sequestration applies at zero costs. The total amount of anthropogenic ocean carbon 
sequestration is large, also in the exclusive economic zones. As a consequence, it substantially 
alters the costs of emission reduction for most countries. Countries such as Australia, 
Denmark, France, Iceland, New Zealand, Norway and Portugal would gain substantially, and 
a large number of countries would benefit too. Current net exporters of carbon permits, 
particularly Russia, would gain less and oppose the inclusion of carbon sinks.  
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  11. Introduction 
There are two options for limiting the increase of carbon dioxide concentrations in the 
atmosphere: emission reduction, and sink enhancement. In the Kyoto Protocol, Annex B 
countries agreed on emission reduction targets. However, terrestrial sinks have entered the 
Kyoto Protocol as offsets for carbon sequestration. The negotiations on “land use, land use 
change and forestry” (LULUCF) were among the most complicated and contentious. Some 
countries have exploited the uncertainties to renegotiate their earlier emission reduction 
targets through the back door. 
Besides terrestrial sinks, there are also ocean sinks.
1 Ocean sinks have escaped attention, 
although marine carbon flows are large and the science is as uncertain and complex as for 
terrestrial sinks. One can therefore expect that, sooner or later, a country will claim that the 
carbon sunk in its part of ocean, is sunk partly by deliberate intervention,
2 and that this should 
be used as an offset against its emissions targets. This paper explores the implications. 
Most of the economic literature on carbon dioxide sinks is placed in the context of the Kyoto 
Protocol and relates to terrestrial carbon sequestration. Eligible activities under the Protocol 
are afforestation, reforestation, forest management, cropland management, grassland 
management and revegetation (UNFCCC, 1997).
3 A number of studies address the potential 
benefits of carbon sequestration in the land use sector and their related costs.
4 Others deal 
with the issue of non-permanence of carbon sequestration in the terrestrial biosphere and its 
environmental, as well as policy and economic implications (e.g. IPCC, 2000; Chomitz, 2000; 
Dutschke, 2002; Ellis, 2001; Fearnside, 2000; Jung, forthcoming; Kirschbaum, 2003; 
Missfeldt and Haites, 2001; Moura-Costa and Wilson, 2000; Noble and Scholes, 2001).  
Marchetti (1977), Parson and Keith (1998), IEA (2001), and Gielen (2003) study the potential 
contribution of geological and ocean carbon storage. Technologies for geological storage are 
available and first projects have been initiated (Gale, 2003; Holloway, forthcoming). For 
ocean storage, there are two approaches: injecting captured CO2 into the deep ocean, and 
fertilizing the ocean with nutrients to increase the draw-down of CO2 from the atmosphere 
(IEA, 2002).  
Riahi et al. (2004) analyze the competitiveness of such technologies relative to other 
mitigation and abatement options. Ha-Duong and Keith (2003) and Herzog et al. (2003) look 
at the implications of temporary carbon storage. Edenhofer et al. (2004) and Reiner and 
Herzog (2004) study the political and regulatory obstacles. 
Proponents of carbon capture and storage technologies claim that it is an option for buying 
time while preparation for emission reductions are made (IEA, 2002). However, cost 
estimates vary widely with capture technology, transport distance and medium as well as 
storage reservoir and depth chosen. There are profitable options as in the case of enhanced oil 
recovery (EOR) and options costing up to € 100 per tCO2 (see e.g. David and Herzog, 2001; 
Hendriks et al., 2001 and 2004). Also, carbon storage bears new environmental risks which 
are currently not well understood. Carbon might not be permanently stored and rapid or slow 
releases of injected emissions could occur. This might not only have impacts on the 
environment, ecosystems or human health, but also on the effectiveness of temporary carbon 
                                                 
1 Note that there is carbon capture and storage as well. However, this is to be accounted for as emission 
reduction and not as removal activities, since the emissions never enter the atmosphere.  
2 Ocean fertilization is the most discussed deliberate intervention. However, in the LULUCF negotiations, the 
interpretation of deliberate intervention was stretched considerably to include things that were neither deliberate 
nor interventions, like e.g. most forest management. 
3 See Article 3.3 and 3.4 of the Kyoto Protocol (UNFCCC, 1997). A specification of these articles can be found 
in the Marrakech Accords (UNFCCC, 2001a and b). 
4 For an overview see e.g. Richards and Stokes (2004). 
  2storage (Baer, 2003; Herzog et al., 2003; Wilson et al., 2003; Smekens and van der Zwaan, 
2004). 
Apart from possible CO2 injection and sequestration by e.g. iron fertilization, the ocean is also 
a natural sink of atmospheric CO2. Almost 50% of the anthropogenic emissions are removed 
by ocean uptake and exchange fluxes with the terrestrial biosphere (Sabine et al., 2004). 
Terrestrial sinks are partly included in the first commitment period of the Kyoto Protocol. 
Countries can offset emissions by LULUCF activities. Some of the forestry activities, 
especially parts of forest management, will apply at zero cost, because they can be considered 
business as usual and will take place anyway.
5 The accounting of forest management was, 
therefore, limited by a country-specific cap (see Appendix Z of the Marrakech Accords; 
UNFCCC, 2001a). These caps reflect to a large extent a country’s bargaining power during 
the negotiations.
6 Although the last few years have seen a growing interest in the potential of 
ocean carbon sinks to limit climate change, they have so far not seriously been considered in 
climate policy. Neither the natural sink of carbon, nor injection or fertilization are eligible 
options. A new round of negotiations is supposed to start in 2005. It will have to agree on 
emission reduction targets and relating rules and modalities for any commitment period 
beyond the year 2012. Ocean sinks are as unexplored and uncertain as was LULUCF in 1997. 
It is not unlikely that ocean sinks will be brought up in future negotiations, either as a way to 
complicate (and hence delay) negotiations, or as a way to offset nominal emission reduction 
targets. 
Regarding ocean sinks and international climate policy, we analyze a counterfactual: What 
would have happened had the Kyoto Protocol allowed for ocean carbon sinks? The advantage 
of taking this case is that we do not compare two hypothetical cases (a second commitment 
period with and without ocean sinks) but rather one hypothetical and one real
7 case. We aim 
to investigate who would gain most from introducing ocean sinks (and is therefore likely to 
propose their use), who would gain modestly (and is therefore unlikely to oppose), and who 
would lose (and is therefore likely to oppose).  
We apply data on anthropogenic carbon sequestration within the exclusive economic zone 
(EEZ) of a country. The EEZ is the maritime zone seawards of the terrestrial sea with an outer 
boundary to up to 200 nautical miles out of the terrestrial sea’s baseline. According to the UN 
Convention on the Law of the Sea, within this zone the country has the sovereign right to 
explore and exploit, conserve and manage living and non-living resources in the water column 
and on the seafloor.
8 However, the overlap of national claims and extended jurisdictions has 
led to areas with disputed ownership and jurisdiction. 
We are aware that it is unlikely that countries will be able to account for the entire natural 
ocean sink and use the anthropogenic (human-induced) CO2 uptake within a countries’ EEZ 
instead. Since factoring-out of human-induced uptake from natural uptake will be difficult, 
countries might try to account for a fraction of the total uptake. Thus, the total uptake serves 
as a maximum value that a country would want to argue for. 
The paper is built up as follows. Section 2 reviews carbon sinks and sources, and maps one 
particular data set to the exclusive economic zones of countries. Section 3 presents a simple 
                                                 
5 This is due to 'gross-net accounting' which does not consider sinks in the calculation of base year emissions 
(Article 3.7 Kyoto Protocol).  
6 Russia e.g. was able to double the amount of forest management cap during the negotiations at COP7 (Fry, 
2002). 
7 Actually, the first commitment period of the Kyoto Protocol will only start in 2008, but its details are well-
established. 
8 See http://www.un.org/Depts/los/index.htm. 
  3model of the costs of emission reduction, with and without trade, and with and without offsets 
for carbon sinks. Section 4 shows and discusses the results. Section 5 concludes. 
2.  Ocean carbon sinks  
Human activity (e.g. fossil fuel burning and land-use change) has led to higher atmospheric 
CO2 concentration and will lead to global warming and other significant climatic changes 
over the next century and beyond. However, without the exchange fluxes with the terrestrial 
biosphere and the ocean uptake of anthropogenic emissions, the concentration would have 
been much higher. Yet, the potential for carbon storage differs widely with respect to place 
and time. According to Houghton (2002) and Rödenbeck et al. (2003) the Northern 
hemisphere land is mainly a sink, while the Southern hemisphere land regions are neutral with 
the tropical land regions taking up carbon.  
The global sea-to-air fluxes of CO2 are dominated by outgassing of CO2 in upwelling regions 
in such as the equatorial Pacific and Atlantic and the Arabian Sea. High influx of CO2 in the 
Southern Ocean and in the Northern high latitudes can be attributed to photosynthetic 
utilization of CO2 in summer and, in some areas, to strong cooling and deep water formation 
(Takahashi et al., 2002).  
The uptake of anthropogenic CO2 is different to the actual flux of CO2, as the preindustrial 
flux has to be subtracted. The difference is extremely difficult to measure. Therefore we use 
results from a model simulation by Wetzel et al. (forthcoming). In general, the uptake of 
anthropogenic CO2 is high where ‘older’ waters, which have not been in contact with the 
atmosphere for a long time, are brought to the surface; such as in the Northern and Southern 
high latitudes and in the equatorial upwelling regions. Particularly in the subtropics, the 
oceanic CO2 partial pressure follows the partial pressure of the atmosphere almost directly 
and the uptake is low. 
Over the next decades, as CO2 levels increase, the oceanic buffer capacity will decrease, and 
the ability of the ocean to absorb more CO2 diminishes (Revelle and Suess, 1957). Also, 
because of climate feedbacks, coupled climate-ocean models suggest that the ocean uptake of 
anthropogenic CO2 may become less efficient in the future (Matear and Hirst, 1999).  
Wetzel et al. (forthcoming) use a state-of-the-art ocean/sea-ice general circulation model 
(MPI-OM) coupled on-line to a marine biogeochemistry model (HAMOCC5). The horizontal 
resolution of the model gradually varies between 20 km in the Arctic and about 350 km in the 
Tropics. The global anthropogenic air-to-sea CO2 fluxes from the model were overlaid with 
the Maritime Claims and Boundaries Database (GMBD) to measure the carbon flux within a 
countries exclusive economic zone.  The GMBD is a GIS based database offering detailed 
information on agreed, disputed and hypothetical boundaries for every coastal nation in the 
world. The derived information was then used to calculate the average annual amount of CO2 
flux for each country.
9 Table 1 displays the size of the exclusive economic zones and the 
amount of carbon dioxide flux (anthropogenic uptake) for all Annex I countries, for two 
cases: undisputed, disputed and hypothetical ownership, and undisputed only. For countries 
with disconnected exclusive economic zones, the numbers were added. Note that a negative 
sign indicates ocean carbon uptake.  
                                                 
9 Information on the average carbon flux is based on monthly data for the period 1990 to 2003. 
  4Table 1: Exclusive economic zones for Annex I countries (area in km
2) and carbon flux 







Anthropogenic Carbon flux 
(000tons CO2 per year)
+  
 
  disputed* undisputed** disputed*  undisputed** 
Australia 11,611,965  7,373,998 -344,289 -160,657
Austria 0  0 0 0
Belgium 895  895 -11 -11
Bulgaria 22,919  22,919 -293 -293
Canada 2,652,622  2,652,622 -55,571 -55,571
Croatia 23,853  23,853 -283 -283
Czech Republic  0  0 0 0
Denmark 60,799  60,799 -5 -5
Estonia 11,305  11,305 -1 -1
Finland 24,755  24,755 -8 -8
France 9,278,917  8,238,077 -169,809 -146,404
Germany 32,905  32,905 -92 -92
Greece 368,618  368,618 -5,336 -5,336
Hungary 0  0 0 0
Iceland 685,042  685,042 -43,471 -43,471
Ireland 0  0 0 0
Italy 384,011  383,798 -5,509 -5,506
Japan 3,650,657  3,363,201 -73,548 -66,186
Latvia 17,852  17,852 -2 -2
Lithuania 4,439  4,439 -1 -1
Luxembourg 0  0 0 0
Netherlands 50,268  50,268 -403 -403
New Zealand  9,975,448  6,279,266 -274,911 -140,493
Norway 5,597,875  1,815,290 -218,983 -70,541
Poland 19,434  19,434 10 10
Portugal 1,595,387  1,595,387 -35,676 -35,676
Romania 19,976  16,425 -244 -212
Russia 5,687,163  5,518,204 -57,191 -53,357
Slovakia 0  0 0 0
Slovenia 0  0 0 0
Spain 794,185  754,406 -16,128 -14,907
Sweden 72,492  72,492 21 21
Switzerland 0  0 0 0
Ukraine 97,595  93,900 -748 -716
UK 6,951,912  2,031,477 -174,891 -39,830
USA 10,640,119  10,597,638 -148,114 -147,602
 
Note: *Exclusive undisputed, disputed and hypothetical ownership; ** exclusive undisputed 
ownership; 
+Difference in flux between present and preindustrial times. 
 
Source: Own calculation based on GMBD and Wetzel et al. (forthcoming). 
 
  5If we would have included information on exclusive fishing zones, the areas for some 
countries would have been larger, with different values for the carbon flux. This applies 
mainly to the UK (2,526,338 km
2), Denmark (2,247,710 km
2) and Ireland (407,489 km
2).
10 
Before the concept of the EEZ was established in the United Nations Convention of the Law 
of the Sea in 1982, most countries claimed exclusive fishing zones. In contrast to fishing 
zones, EEZ jurisdiction involves duties as well as rights (UNCLOS Part V). It is 
straightforward to turn fisheries zones into exclusive economic zones, extending fisheries 
rights to rights over mineral resources as well as, presumably, carbon dioxide. 
 
3. The  market 
Above, we considered ocean carbon sinks. These have a value only if they can be used as an 
offset against emission reduction obligations. In this section, we introduce a simple model of 
the international market in carbon dioxide emission permits. This model allows to evaluate 
the implications of the inclusion of ocean carbon sinks on the costs of emission reduction and 
their distribution. It also allows us to evaluate who would win and loose from including ocean 
carbon sinks. 
Let us consider a market for tradable emission reduction permits with I countries. Emission 
reduction costs C are quadratic. Each country solves the problem: 
(1a)   
2
, min  s.t. 
ii
ii i i i i i ii RPCR Y P R E P E απ =+ + ≥ − i A
j A
R is proportional emission reduction; Y is gross domestic product; P denotes the amount of 
emission permits bought or sold; π is the emission permit price; assuming a perfect market, all 
companies face the same price; E are the emissions; A are the allocated emission permits; that 
is, if a country emits more than has been allocated, E>A, it will have to reduce emissions or 
buy permits on the market; α is a parameter; country are indexed by i. If a country’s allocation 
exceeds its emissions, E<A, the optimization problem is: 
(1b)   
2
, min  s.t. 
jj
jj j j j j j jj RPC R YR EPP E αππ =− + ≥ −
We assume that the country sells its hot air P=E-A, and in addition reduces emissions by RE 
which it sells at the market for πRE. Fixing A, we in fact assume that countries with hot air do 
not have market power. Countries with hot air are indexed by j. 
Countries without emission reduction targets are excluded from the market. Although such 
countries could supply emission permits through the Clean Development Mechanisms of the 
Kyoto Protocol, the transaction costs of this are high, so that the actual supply is likely to be 
limited. 
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10 The other countries are the Netherlands (66,730 km
2), Australia (30,223 km
2), Norway (2,735 km
2), the 
Russian Federation (2,735 km
2), France (82 km
2) and Italy (67 km
2). 
  6where λ denotes the Lagrange multiplier. This is a system with 3(I+J) equations and 3(I+J)+1 
unknowns, but we also have that aggregate supply must equal aggregate supply, that is 
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So, the permit price goes up if the emission reduction obligation increases or if the costs of 
emission reduction increase. All companies face the same marginal costs of emission 
reduction, and the trade-off between reducing emissions in-house and buying or selling 
permits is driven by the ratio of marginal emission reduction costs and the permit price. The 
modeled market behaves as expected. Note that the solution without the market in emission 
permits (Pi=0) is trivial. 
Rehdanz and Tol (forthcoming) consider the special case I=2. Rehdanz and Tol (2004) 
expand the model to two periods, including dynamic permit allocation and banking and 
borrowing. 
Following Tol (2003), we specify 






α =− −  
which states that countries that emit a lot of (little) carbon relative to their production, have 
low (high) emission reduction costs. This specification was calibrated to the literature review 
of Hourcade et al. (1996 and 2001). It gives emission reduction costs for each country in the 
world for which we have emissions and GDP data. 
For the numerical illustration we collected data for the period 1990 to 2010. The year 2010 
refers to the middle of the first commitment period. Data on emissions (measured in tons 
CO2) and GDP (measured in constant 1995 US $) for 1990, 1995 and 2000 were taken from 
the World Resources Institute. The data for emissions and GDP were projected to 2005 and 
2010 using information on the average annual percent change for the period 2001 to 2025 
(IEA, 2004). Data on population was taken from the World Resources Institute for the whole 
period from 1990 to 2010. Emission reduction targets are those of the Kyoto Protocol.
11 
Although ocean sinks are obviously not part of the first commitment period of the Kyoto 
Protocol, we use this hypothetical case because data are relatively sound and abatement 
targets known. We multiplied the average annual anthropogenic CO2 sunk by three to account 
for the period 2008-2010. Data on allowable terrestrial sinks were taken from the UNFCCC 
(the so called Appendix Z of the Marrakech Accords; see UNFCCC, 2001a). This data refers 
                                                 
11 See http://unfccc.int/resource/docs/convkp/kpeng.pdf. 
  7to the allowable accounting of forest management towards the reduction targets and is given 
in tons of carbon per year.
12 To account for the maximum amount of emission reduction in the 
first commitment period the data was multiplied by three (and converted into tons of CO2 per 
year). Both sinks used here are zero cost sinks.  
 
4. Results 
Based on the model described above and the emission reduction targets agreed to in the Kyoto 
Protocol, we calculated the emission reduction obligation for each Annex I country for the 
year 2010, the middle year of the first commitment period. Table 2 presents the costs of 
emission reduction for twelve different cases. We distinguish six cases, and analyze each with 
and without permit trade: 
-  I: no LULUCF and no ocean sinks  
-  II: no ocean sinks but LULUCF (country-caps under forest management)  
-  III: no LULUCF but ocean sinks for exclusive economic zones with undisputed 
ownership (ocean sinks are restricted to 10% of the anthropogenic uptake for the 
first commitment period)  
-  IV: no LULUCF but ocean sinks for exclusive economic zones with undisputed, 
disputed and hypothetical ownership (ocean sinks are restricted to 10% of the 
anthropogenic uptake for the first commitment period)  
-  V: no LULUCF but ocean sinks for exclusive economic and fishing zones with 
undisputed ownership (ocean sinks are restricted to 10% of the anthropogenic 
uptake for the first commitment period) 
-  VI: LULUCF and ocean sinks for exclusive economic zones with undisputed 
ownership (ocean sinks are restricted to 10% of the anthropogenic uptake for the 
first commitment period) 
Without international permit trade, ocean carbon sinks would reduce costs, particularly in 
Australia, France, Iceland, New Zealand, Norway, and Portugal. This is true even if only 10% 
of all “anthropogenic” carbon is counted (scenario III). Australia and the UK sink substantial 
carbon in the disputed parts of their exclusive economic zone (scenario IV). Denmark and 
Ireland would benefit if fishing zones are included (scenario V). See Table 2. 
The results confirm that international trade reduces the costs of emission reduction. If 
countries would be allowed to account for ocean carbon sinks, this would reduce total costs 
further. The effect of a 10% use of ocean carbon sinks within a country’s undisputed 
exclusive economic zone (scenario III) is marked. Most permit selling countries would loose, 
while most buyers show significant gains. Gains are particularly pronounced for countries 
such as France, Iceland, New Zealand, Norway and Portugal, who become net exporters of 
carbon permits. If its disputed EEZ is counted, Australia would also become a carbon 
exporter. An increase in the percentage use of ocean carbon sinks (not displayed) would be 
especially beneficial for Australia, Canada, France, Japan, New Zealand, the UK and the US. 
Most permit sellers would prefer to exclude ocean sinks, as they would sell less permits on the 
market and would gain less from emission permit trade. These losses are substantial, ranging 
from 18% (Latvia) to 43% (Hungary) in scenario III; Russia loses 21% of its revenues. As 
disputed EEZs and fishing zones are included, losses increase further. However, these 
                                                 
12 LULUCF in Annex I countries is considered by deducing the country specific forest management caps from 
the respective emission reduction targets.  
  8countries would still gain from exporting permits; ocean carbon sinks would make them gain 
less, but would not lead to net costs of greenhouse gas emission reduction. 
Comparing scenario III to scenario II (ocean carbon sinks versus forest management under 
LULUCF), most permit buying countries are better off under the  scenario II. Only Australia, 
France, Iceland, New Zealand, Norway and Portugal would prefer ocean sinks to terrestrial 
sinks. Compared to the LULUCF scenario with a total allowable reduction under forest 
management of 767 000 tCO2 for Annex I countries, scenario III allows for a total maximum 
reduction of 296 000 tCO2 only. Setting the percentage use of ocean carbon sinks to allow for 
a total reduction of 767 000 tCO2 in scenario II, Canada, Greece, Italy and Spain would join 
the above group preferring ocean carbon sinks. Even if the anthropogenic carbon flux for all 
exclusive economic zones including zones with undisputed, disputed and hypothetical 
ownership (scenario IV) is used to reduce emission reduction obligations, the effect is the 
same. Cost savings are again large for example for Australia, Norway and New Zealand. If 
fisheries zones are included (scenario V), Denmark would also gain considerably from the 
inclusion of ocean sinks.  
In scenario VI, we compare the hypothetical case where both terrestrial sinks (country-caps 
under forest management) and ocean carbon sinks (for exclusive economic zones with 
undisputed ownership, restricted to 10% of the anthropogenic uptake for the first commitment 
period) are allowed. The total allowable reduction for Annex I countries is further decreased 
to 1 073 000 tCO2.The positive and negative effects for most countries would be more 
pronounced compared to scenarios II and III. Only a few countries would gain less (Iceland, 
New Zealand, Norway, Sweden and Switzerland).  
 
  9Table 2: Emission reduction targets and costs of emission reduction for Annex I countries for different cases (in million US$)
13.  
Countries with numbers in bold gain from the inclusion of (ocean) sinks, countries in italics lose. 
 





































  I                        II III IV V VI I II III IV V VI
Australia 108 602 602 165 0 164 165  292 167 114 -29 111 57
Austria 87 358 136 358 358 358 136  58 19 48 42 47 13
Belgium 93 242 235 242 242 242 235  71 38 59 51 57 26
Bulgaria    92 0 0 0 0 0 0 -101 -55 -80 -66 -77 -35
Canada 94 616 601 438 438 438 425  306 173 213 187 207 98
Croatia  000000  - 5 95 -2 -4 -3 -4 -1
Czech Rep.  92 0 0 0 0 0 0 -108 -52 -82 -66 -78 -32
Denmark 79 136 121 136 136 0 121  29 15 24 21 -37 10
Estonia  000000  - 6 5 92 -35 -52 -44 -50 -23
Finland 100 56 34 56 56 56 34  24 10 20 17 19 7
France 100 452 284 2 0 2 0  144 63 -1 -16 -1 -10
Germany 79 272 171 271 271 271 170  176 81 151 134 147 56
Greece 125 20 16 14 14 14 10  19 11 13 12 12 6
Hungary    94 0 0 0 0 0 0 -7 -7 -4 -3 -4 -4
Iceland  110000   00 110 -36 -31 -35 -15
Ireland 113 148 135 148 148 47 135  40 21 33 29 17 14
Italy 94 1,082 1,041 1,048 1,048 1,048 1,008  324 176 265 230 257 116
Japan 94 5,813 1,738 5,105 5,029 5,105 1,361  1,014 295 785 673 761 175
Latvia  000000  - 5 1 92 -34 -42 -36 -41 -22
Lithuania  000000  - 8 1 92 -48 -66 -56 -64 -31
Luxembourg  46663 72 32 29 32 32 32 29  8
Netherlands 94 980 976 976 976 964 972  207 113 171 148 165 75
New Zealand  100 156 106 0 0 0 0  39 17 -84 -168 -82 -38
                                                 
13 Sinks are referring to ocean sinks only. 
  10Norway  70000   101 51 21 4 -41 -141 -40 -22
Poland  333 94 3 0 0  -65 -26 -39 -26 -36 -11
Portugal 127 75 47 0 0 0 0  34 15 -1 0 -1 -2
Romania    92 0 0 0 0 0 0 -197 -116 -156 -131 -150 -74
Russia    100 0 0 0 0 0 0 -3,692 -2,036 -2,916 -2,419 -2,799 -1,301
Slovakia  000000  - 6 1 92 -40 -49 -41 -47 -26
Slovenia 92 23 0 23 23 23 0  10 -1 9 7 8 -1
Spain 115 656 523 574 567 574 450  212 105 165 143 160 66
Sweden  444 333 104 4 0 0  3 -9 -6
Switzerland 92 53 0 53 53 53 0  12 -3 10 9 10 -2
Ukraine    100 0 0 0 0 0 0 -1,555 -730 -1,208 -1,000 -1,159 -455
UK 88 1,154 1,087 964 446 749 903  420 227 318 181 269 140
USA 93 14,165 9,649 13,462 13,460 13,462 9,071  5,316 2,428 4,335 3,775 4,208 1,598
   
Total    95 27,148 17,538 24,072 23,302 23,607 15,225 2,790 787 1,882 1,390 1,762 347









  115.  Discussion and conclusion 
We analyze the implications of ocean carbon sinks on international climate policy. A number 
of conclusions emerge. First, anthropogenic ocean carbon sinks (rather, the difference 
between current and pre-industrial ocean carbon sinks) are significant, also in the exclusive 
economic zones, compared to the terrestrial carbon sinks claimed in the Marrakech Accords. 
Second, although global emission reduction costs of all countries are affected by the inclusion 
of ocean carbon sinks (a corollary of the first conclusion), a few countries would face 
considerably lower costs for meeting their emission reduction obligations. These countries are 
Australia, France, Iceland, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal and, perhaps, Denmark (if it were 
to claim its fisheries zone as an exclusive economic zone). These countries have large ocean 
areas. Third, these countries would gain more under a system of international trade in 
emission permits. Fourth, the losses for big carbon permit exporters (e.g. Russia) would be 
substantial (again, a corollary of the first conclusion).  
Therefore, it seems fair to predict that, at some time during the international negotiations on 
the second, perhaps third commitment period, its rule and emission reduction obligations, one 
or more of the above-mentioned countries will propose that ocean carbon sinks can be used as 
an off-set against emission abatement obligations. A few countries would gain substantially, 
and a larger number of countries would gain less. Of course, there would be opposition to this 
proposal, coming from two sides. Net exporters of carbon permits in the situation without 
ocean carbon sinks would gain less, but they would still gain and their opposition to ocean 
carbon sinks would easily be classified as “the pot calling the kettle black”. Environmentalists 
would also protest. However, ocean carbon sinks are small compared to the terrestrial sinks 
included in the Marrakech Accords. 
The analysis above is in many ways rudimentary, but the conclusions are robust nonetheless. 
The amount of carbon sunk in the ocean is uncertain, and so is the difference between the 
amount sunk at present and the amount sunk in pre-industrial times. However, we widely 
varied the ocean carbon sink in our scenarios, and the basic structure of the conclusions did 
not change. The details of the spatial distribution of ocean carbon sinks are very uncertain, 
too. We did not vary this, but most studies would agree with the basic spatial pattern used 
here. The costs of emission reductions are uncertain, but this uncertainty makes ocean carbon 
sinks more or less relevant. It changes the intensity with which countries would argue for 
inclusion of ocean carbon sinks, not the argument itself. Finally, we used the first 
commitment period to study the implications of ocean carbon sinks, rather than the second 
commitment period in which they may surface. However, countries’ roles are unlikely to 
change in the near future. The countries of the OECD are likely to remain the drivers behind 
emission reduction, the countries of Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union are likely to 
continue to supply cheap emission reduction, and the countries with large swathes of ocean 
would continue to benefit from the inclusion of ocean carbon sinks. The political dynamics 
would change, if ocean carbon sources would count as well. Countries with substantial net 
outgassing of carbon dioxide in their exclusive economic zones, however, are in the tropics. 
These countries are unlikely to accept emission reduction obligations any time soon. 
Therefore, we are reasonably confident in our prediction that ocean carbon sinks will be 
tabled at the international climate negotiations in the foreseeable future. Although it is 
certainly possible that there would be technical negotiations as contracted as those on 
LULUCF, ocean carbon sinks are much smaller and therefore less damaging to global 
emission abatement efforts. 
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